Criminal Law The University of the West Indies Cave Hill Campus

The University of the West Indies Cave Hill Campus

Criminal Law The University of the West Indies Cave Hill Campus

Worksheet 1 – Murder………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4
Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority (1991) 1 All E.R. 801, 817 (missing)……………………………..4
R v Poulton (1832) 5 C & P 329…………………………………………………………………………………………..4
R v Brain (1834) 6 C & P 349……………………………………………………………………………………………..4
R v Reeves (1839) 9 C & P 25……………………………………………………………………………………………..4
Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) (1997) 3 All ER 936………………………………………….4
R v Dyson (1908) 2 K.B. 454………………………………………………………………………………………………5
R v Adams (1957) Crim. L.R. 365………………………………………………………………………………………..6
R v White (1910) 2 K.B. 124; 22 Cox C.C. 325……………………………………………………………………..6
R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr.App. Rep. 152………………………………………………………………………………..6
R v Smith (1959) 2 Q.B. 35; (1959) 2 All E.R. 193; (1959) 2 W.L.R. 623; 43 Cr. App.Rep. 121…..7
R v Blaue (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1411; (1975) 3 All E.R. 446; 61 Cr.App. Rep. 269…………………………..8
R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110………………………………………………………………………………………………..8
R v Cheshire (1991) 3 All E.R. 670………………………………………………………………………………………9
R v Williams (1992) 2 All E.R. 183 C.A……………………………………………………………………………..10
R v Dear [1996] Crim LR 595……………………………………………………………………………………………10
R v Corbett [1996] Crim. L.R. 594 CA………………………………………………………………………………..11
Re A (Conjoined Twins) (2000) 4 All E.R. 961……………………………………………………………………11
R v Cunningham (1957) 2 Q.B 396…………………………………………………………………………………….13
R v Caldwell (1981) 1 All E.R. 96………………………………………………………………………………………13
R v G and R [2003] UKHL 50 (overrulling Caldwell)……………………………………………………………14
Hyam v DPP [1975] A.C. 55……………………………………………………………………………………………..14
R v Moloney [1985] A.C. 905……………………………………………………………………………………………15
R v Hancock & Shankland [1986] A.C. 455…………………………………………………………………………16
R v Nedrick [1986] 3 All E.R 1; [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025…………………………………………………………16
R v Woolin (1998) 4 All E.R. 103………………………………………………………………………………………17
R v Matthews and R v Alleyne (2003) 2 Cr. App. R. 30………………………………………………………..17
R v Vickers is important……………………………………………………………………………………………………17
R vs Rahman…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..18
Worksheet 2 – (Voluntary Manslaughter)……………………………………………………………………………19
R vs Julien (1970) 16 WIR 395………………………………………………………………………………………….19
Julien v R [1970] 16 WIR 395……………………………………………………………………………………………20
Lett v R [1963] 6 WIR 92………………………………………………………………………………………………….21
R v Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932………………………………………………………………………………………….21
R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889……………………………………………………………………………………22
R v Baillie [1995] 2 Cr App R 31……………………………………………………………………………………….22
R v Thornton [1992] 1 All ER 306……………………………………………………………………………………..23
R v Acott [1997] 1 WLR 306…………………………………………………………………………………………….24
1
2
Vasquez v R [1994] 45 WIR 103 Luc………………………………………………………………………………….24
Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1996] 3 WLR 45 AG…………………………………………………………………………24
AG for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 Cr App R 36……………………………………………………………………..25
R v James; R v Karimi [2006] 1 All ER 759………………………………………………………………………..26
R v Serrano [2006] Crim LR 569……………………………………………………………………………………….27
R v Davies [1975] 1 QB 691……………………………………………………………………………………………..27
R v Johnson [1989] 2 ALLER 839 CA………………………………………………………………………………..28
R v Pearson [1992] Crim LR 193 CA………………………………………………………………………………….28
Ramjattan v The State (No 2) [1999] 57 WIR 501………………………………………………………………..28
Bristol v R BB 2002 CA 33……………………………………………………………………………………………….29
R Byrne (1960) 2 QB 396………………………………………………………………………………………………….30
R vs Atkinson (1985)………………………………………………………………………………………………………..30
Walton vs The Queen [ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF BARBADOS]……..31
R v Dietschmann (2003) 1 All ER 897………………………………………………………………………………..31
Worksheet 3 (Involuntary Manslaughter)……………………………………………………………………………31
R v Lamb [1967] 2 All ER 1282…………………………………………………………………………………………31
Dias [2002] 2 Cr App……………………………………………………………………………………………………….31
Kennedy (no.2) [2007] 3 WLR 612…………………………………………………………………………………….32
Arobieke [1988] Crim LR 314……………………………………………………………………………………………33
R v Lowe [1973] QB 702………………………………………………………………………………………………….33
Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576………………………………………………………………………………………….34
DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976] 2 All ER 365…………………………………………………………………..34
AG’s Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1997] 3 All ER 936…………………………………………………………….34
R v Goodfellow [1986] 83 Cr App R23……………………………………………………………………………….35
R v Larkin [1943] 1 All ER 217…………………………………………………………………………………………35
R v Church [1965] 2 All ER 72………………………………………………………………………………………….35
Dawson [1985] 81 Cr App R 150……………………………………………………………………………………….36
R v Ball [1989] Crim LR 730…………………………………………………………………………………………….36
R v Adomako 1994 3 All E.R. 79……………………………………………………………………………………….37
Singh (1999) Crim LR 582 CA…………………………………………………………………………………………..38
Lidar (2000) Archbold News 3 CA……………………………………………………………………………………..38
Worksheet 4 (Non-Fatal Offences Against The Person)………………………………………………………..39
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commisioner [1969] EW 582……………………………………………………39
Spratt [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1073, EW 627………………………………………………………………………………..39
R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981……………………………………………………………………………………………….40
Byrne [1968] SH 401………………………………………………………………………………………………………..40
R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689…………………………………………………………………………………….40
R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1997] [1997] 3 WLR 534……………………………………………………………..41
R v Constanza [1997] Crim LR 576……………………………………………………………………………………41
2
3
R v Savage [1991] 94 Cr App R 193…………………………………………………………………………………..42
R v Savage, R v Parmenter [1991] 4 All ER 698, (1992) EW 625, SHC 89………………………………42
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374……………………………………………………………………………….43
Wilson v Pringle [1986] 2 All ER 440…………………………………………………………………………………44
R v Miller [1954] 2 QB 282……………………………………………………………………………………………….45
R v Burstow [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 144………………………………………………………………………………..45
Mowatt (1968) 1 QB 421 SH 426……………………………………………………………………………………….46
C (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] 1 QB 331…………………………………………………………………………46
Burrell v Harmer [1965] 3 All ER 684………………………………………………………………………………..47
R v D [1984] 1 AC 778 Missing…………………………………………………………………………………………47
Bolduc and Bird v R (1967) 63 DLR (2d) 82 Missing……………………………………………………………47
R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75…………………………………………………………………………………………..47
R v Wilson [1996] 3 WLR 125…………………………………………………………………………………………..48
R v Richardson [1999] QB 444 CA…………………………………………………………………………………….49
R v Tabassum [2000] Crim LR 686…………………………………………………………………………………….49
R v Dica [2004] Q.B. 1257………………………………………………………………………………………………..50
R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr. App.R. 14…………………………………………………………………………………..51
R v Coney [1882] 8 QBD 534……………………………………………………………………………………………51
R v Bradshaw [1878] 14 Cox 83 Missing…………………………………………………………………………….52
R v Moore [1898] 14 TLR 229 Missing………………………………………………………………………………52
R v Jones [1986] 83 Cr App Rep 375………………………………………………………………………………….52
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Worksheet 1 – Murder
Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority (1991) 1 All E.R. 801, 817 (missing)
R v Poulton (1832) 5 C & P 329
Facts
A mother strangled her newborn baby, and was charged with the murder. Three medical men
testified before a jury that a child can die during the delivery, thus the fact that a child
breathes when it is born before it its whole body is delivered does not mean that it is born
alive:
“It frequently happens that a child is born as far as the head is concerned, and breathes, but
death takes place before the whole delivery is complete. My opinion in this case is, that the
child had breathed; but I cannot take upon myself to say that it was wholly born alive.”
Issue
The issue in question was when a foetus becomes a ‘human being’ for the purposes of murder
and manslaughter.
Held
An unborn child is incapable of being killed. A child is born only when the whole body is
brought into the world, but it is not sufficient that the child breathes in the progress of the
birth, as the child may die before the whole delivery takes place. For a murder or
manslaughter conviction, a child must be killed after it has been fully delivered alive from the
mother’s body. In this case the jury found the child not to be born alive, and therefore the
mother could not be guilty of murder. The case of A-G’s Ref (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR
421 confirmed that an unborn foetus is not capable of being murdered, but a manslaughter
conviction can stand where the foetus was subsequently born alive but dies afterwards from
injuries inflicted whilst in the womb.
R v Brain (1834) 6 C & P 349
(Missing)
R v Reeves (1839) 9 C & P 25
(Missing)
Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) (1997) 3 All ER 936
The defendant stabbed his pregnant girlfriend in the face, abdomen and back when she was
22-24 weeks pregnant. 17 days after the incident the woman went into premature labour and
gave birth to a live baby. The baby died 121 days later due to the premature birth. The
defendant was charged with wounding and GBH on the mother and convicted for which he
received a sentence of 4 years. On the death of the baby he was also charged with murder and
manslaughter. The trial judge held that he could not be convicted of murder or manslaughter
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5
since at the time of the attack the foetus was not in law classed as a human being and thus the
mens rea aimed at the mother could not be transferred to the foetus as it would constitute a
different offence. The Attorney General referred the following point of law:
“1.1 Subject to the proof by the prosecution of the requisite intent in either case: whether the
crimes of murder or manslaughter can be committed where unlawful injury is deliberately
inflicted:
(i) to a child in utero
(ii) to a mother carrying a child in utero
where the child is subsequently born alive, enjoys an existence independent of the mother,
thereafter dies and the injuries inflicted while in utero either caused or made a substantial
contribution to the death.
“1.2 Whether the fact that the death of the child is caused solely as a consequence of injury to
the mother rather than as a consequence of direct injury to the foetus can negative any
liability for murder or manslaughter in the circumstances set out in question 1.1.”
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision in relation to murder. The defendant appealed to
the House of Lords
Held:
The appellant’s actions could not amount to murder for the reasons given by the trial judge.
However, his actions could amount to constructive manslaughter. There was no requirement
that the foetus be classed as a human being provided causation was proved. The attack on the
mother was an unlawful act which caused the death of the baby. There is no requirement
under constructive manslaughter that the unlawful act is aimed at the actual victim or that the
unlawful act was directed at a human being.
R v Dyson (1908) 2 K.B. 454
Facts
A child’s certain and imminent death due meningitis was accelerated by the child’s father’s
infliction of serious injuries
Issue
Did the father cause death?
Decision
Yes
Reasoning
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Accelerating death is enough for the law to consider someone as causing death
R v Adams (1957) Crim. L.R. 365
Dr Bodkins Adams had administered a lethal dose of pain killers to a terminally ill patient.
Held:
Dr Bodkins was acquitted of murder.
Devlin J:
“a life shortened by weeks or months is just as much murder as one shortened by years….
However, a doctor is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and
suffering even if such measures may incidentally shorten life.”
R v White (1910) 2 K.B. 124; 22 Cox C.C. 325
Facts
The defendant put poison into the evening drink of the victim, his mother, with the intention
of killing her. The victim drank a few sips of the drink and then fell asleep. She did not wake
up, however the medical evidence was that she had died of a heart attack rather than as a
result of the poison. The defendant also gave evidence that he had not intended to kill her by
a single dose but had planned to deliver multiple doses over a longer period of time. The
defendant was convicted of attempted murder.
Issue
On appeal, the question arose as to whether the defendant could be liable for murder given
that his actions had not factually caused the death. A second issue was whether having
delivered a single dose was a sufficient ‘attempt’ to ground the conviction in light of the
evidence that the defendant had intended the victim to die as a result of later doses which
were never administered.
Held
The court established the ‘but for’ test of causation, according to which the defendant could
not be convicted unless it could be shown that ‘but for’ his actions the victim would not have
died. On the facts of this case the test was not met, therefore the defendant could not be
convicted of murder.
On the issue of attempt, the court held that it was sufficient that the attempted murder had
been begun, notwithstanding that the defendant had not completed his plan. The conviction
for attempted murder was therefore upheld.
R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr.App. Rep. 152
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Facts
Jordan, who worked for the United States Air Force, stabbed a man as the result of a
disturbance. The victim died in hospital eight days later. The post-mortem found that the
victim died of broncho-pneumonia following the abdominal injury sustained. The court in the
first instance found Jordan guilty. The doctor who treated the victim contacted the United
States Air Force authorities as he took a different view as to the cause of death. Leave was
approved for the gathering of further evidence.
Issue
A key issue in this case was whether and under what circumstances could a court listen to
additional evidence. One of the pre-requisites for such an application was that it must be
shown the evidence was not available at the initial trial stage. The appellant had also raised
various defences including provocation, self-defence and the fact that it was an accident.
Held
The court held that the additional evidence was of a nature that would probably have affected
the jury’s verdict. The additional evidence opined that the death was not caused by the wound
at all but that the medical treatment was inappropriate. The victim was intolerant to
terramycin which was noticed and initially stopped before being continued the following day
by another doctor. They had also introduced abnormal quantities of fluid which waterlogged
the victim’s lungs. This evidence was not available at the initial trial and it was believed that
a jury would listen to opinion of two doctors that had the standing the experts did in this case.
On this basis, the conviction was quashed.
R v Smith (1959) 2 Q.B. 35; (1959) 2 All E.R. 193; (1959) 2 W.L.R. 623; 43 Cr. App.Rep.
121
Facts
The defendant was a soldier who stabbed one of his comrades during a fight in an army
barracks. The victim was taken to receive medical attention, but whilst being carried to the
hospital was dropped twice by those carrying him. Once at the hospital, he received negligent
medical treatment; the medics failed to diagnose a puncture to his lung. The victim died of
his injuries, and the defendant was charged with murder and convicted at first instance. The
defendant appealed on the basis that the victim would have survived but for the negligence of
those treating him. He also argued that his confession had been obtained under duress and
was therefore inadmissible.
Issue
The issue was whether the negligence on the part of the doctors was capable of breaking the
chain of causation between the defendant’s action in stabbing the victim, and his ultimate
death.
Held
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The court held that the stab wound was an operating cause of the victim’s death; it did not
matter that it was not the sole cause. In order to break the chain of causation, an event must
be:
“…unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events [and] can be described
as either unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic” (p. 43).
The chain of causation was not broken on the facts of this case.
With respect to the issue of duress, the court held that as the threat was made some time
before the relevant confession and was no longer active at the time of the defendant’s
statement, it did not render the evidence inadmissible. The conviction for murder was
therefore upheld.
R v Blaue (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1411; (1975) 3 All E.R. 446; 61 Cr.App. Rep. 269
Facts
After the victim refused the defendant’s sexual advances the defendant stabbed the victim
four times. Whist the victim was admitted to hospital she required medical treatment which
involved a blood transfusion. The victim was a Jehovah’s Witness whose religious views
precluded accepting a blood transfusion. She was informed that without a blood transfusion
she would die but still refused to countenance treatment as a result of her religious
conviction. The victim subsequently died and the defendant was charged with manslaughter
by way of diminished responsibility. The defendant appealed.
Issue
Did the victim’s refusal to accept medical treatment constitute a novus actus interveniens and
so break the chain of causation between the defendant’s act and her death? Whether the test
laid down in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 was to be applied because of an omission on
behalf of the victim.
Held
The appeal was dismissed. The stab wound and not the girl’s refusal to accept medical
treatment was the operating cause of death. The victim’s rejection of a blood transfusion did
not break the chain of causation. The defendant must take their victim as they find them and
this includes the characteristics and beliefs of the victim and not just their physical condition.
Unlike in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 the victim’s decision was an omission and not
a positive act and so the test was not of whether the omission was reasonably foreseeable. In
the case of omissions by the victim ‘egg-shell skull’ rule was to be applied. Even if R v
Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 is applied the victim’s response was foreseeable taking into
account their particular characteristics.
R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110
Causation and whether consent of victim to injections is relevant; requirements of unlawful
and malicious administration of “noxious thing” under s. 23 of the Offences against the
Person Act 1861
8
9
Facts
Mr Cato and the victim prepared their own syringes and then injected each other with heroin.
The victim died. Mr Cato was convicted of manslaughter and administering a noxious thing
contrary to s. 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He appealed against his
conviction.
Issue
The jury was asked to decide whether the injection caused, contributed to or accelerated the
victim’s death. The judge did not provide the direction that cause or contribution should be
substantial, and advised the jury that the victim’s consent to the heroin injection was
irrelevant to the consideration of whether Mr Cato was reckless or grossly negligent (i.e.
whether he committed manslaughter). Mr Cato argued that the trial judge had thus
misdirected the jury. He also claimed that heroin was not a “noxious” thing and that
“malicious” administration under s. 23 OAPA 1861 had not occurred – i.e. the act of injection
was not unlawful.
Held
The injection of heroin had to be the cause of death in order to find that manslaughter had
taken place. Even though no express directions were given about the necessity of
“substantial” cause of death, it must have been clear to the jury that more than a de minimis
contribution was required. Secondly, the victim’s consent might be relevant to the finding of
recklessness or gross negligence but consent in itself is not a defence to manslaughter. The
jury was thus not misdirected. Thirdly, as Mr Cato had unlawfully taken heroin into his
possession in order to inject the victim with it, the act of injection was itself unlawful in
relation to the charge of manslaughter. Finally, heroin is a potentially harmful substance and
thus a “noxious” thing for the purposes of s. 23 OAPA 1861; since the act of administration
was deliberate and direct, there is no need to find “maliciousness”.
R v Cheshire (1991) 3 All E.R. 670
Facts
Cheshire shot a man during the course of an argument. The victim was taken to hospital to
have surgery and shortly after developed respiratory issues. The doctors inserted a
tracheotomy tube, which remained in place for four weeks and initially improved the victim’s
condition. Several days later the victim complained of respiratory issues, his condition soon
worsened and he died shortly afterwards. The post-mortem found that the victim’s windpipe
had narrowed near the location where the tracheotomy pipe had been inserted. Cheshire was
subsequently charged with murder and convicted. The decision was appealed.
Issue
A key issue in this case was whether the accused’s acts of shooting the victim had caused the
death or whether the chain of causation was broken by the negligent medical treatment that
the victim had received following being injured by the shooting. The judge in this case
directed the jury to decide whether Cheshire’s acts could have made a ‘significant
9
10
contribution’ to the victim’s death. Importantly, the judge directed the jury that the acts need
not be the sole or even main cause of death.
Held
Appeal dismissed. The jury was not required to evaluate the competing causes of death and
therefore the judge was right to direct them as he did in the first instance. It was clear that the
negligent medical treatment in this case was the immediate cause of the victim’s death but
that did not absolve the accused unless the treatment was so independent the accused’s act to
regard the contribution as insignificant.
R v Williams (1992) 2 All E.R. 183 C.A.
The victim was a hitchhiker picked up by Mr Williams; Mr Davis and Mr Bobat were
passengers in the car. After a few miles, the victim jumped out of the moving car and
suffered fatal injuries. Mr Williams and Mr Davis were convicted of manslaughter and
robbery after the jury accepted that they robbed the victim (as pre-planned) and threatened
him with physical violence as a result of which he jumped out of the car; Mr Bobat was
acquitted. Mr Williams and Davis appealed.
Issue
The judge directed the jury that statements to the police could only be used against the maker
of the statement, but Mr Williams argued that the evidence was too tenuous to go before the
jury, and that his conviction was inconsistent with Mr Bobat’s acquittal. Mr Davis claimed
that the judge should have accepted a submission of no case to answer; that his conviction
was based on Mr Bobat’s statement to the police and that evidence of the mere presence of a
knife and stick in the car should not have been admitted.
Held
Firstly, the evidence shown in order to prove the presence of a joint enterprise to rob the
victim applied equally against all defendants and thus the conviction of Messrs Williams and
Davis was indeed inconsistent with Mr Bobat’s acquittal. It follows that that the jury must
have used the defendants’ statements to the police against other defendants, despite the
judge’s direction to the contrary. Further, the jury should have been directed that the victim’s
actions must be proportional to the gravity of the threat. Based on these failures, joint
enterprise could not be proven and, consequently, the case for robbery failed. In the absence
of an unlawful act, the elements of manslaughter were also not present.
R v Dear [1996] Crim LR 595
The defendant’s daughter accused a man of sexually abusing her. The defendant went after
man and repeatedly slashed him with a Stanley knife. The victim received medical treatment
but later re-opened his wounds in what was thought to be a suicide and died two days after
the initial attack. The defendant argued the man’s actions in opening the wounds amounted to
a novus actus intervenes.
HeldWorksheet 1 – Murder………………………………………………………………………………………………………….4
Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority (1991) 1 All E.R. 801, 817 (missing)……………………………..4
R v Poulton (1832) 5 C & P 329…………………………………………………………………………………………..4
R v Brain (1834) 6 C & P 349……………………………………………………………………………………………..4
R v Reeves (1839) 9 C & P 25……………………………………………………………………………………………..4
Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) (1997) 3 All ER 936………………………………………….4
R v Dyson (1908) 2 K.B. 454………………………………………………………………………………………………5
R v Adams (1957) Crim. L.R. 365………………………………………………………………………………………..6
R v White (1910) 2 K.B. 124; 22 Cox C.C. 325……………………………………………………………………..6
R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr.App. Rep. 152………………………………………………………………………………..6
R v Smith (1959) 2 Q.B. 35; (1959) 2 All E.R. 193; (1959) 2 W.L.R. 623; 43 Cr. App.Rep. 121…..7
R v Blaue (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1411; (1975) 3 All E.R. 446; 61 Cr.App. Rep. 269…………………………..8
R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110………………………………………………………………………………………………..8
R v Cheshire (1991) 3 All E.R. 670………………………………………………………………………………………9
R v Williams (1992) 2 All E.R. 183 C.A……………………………………………………………………………..10
R v Dear [1996] Crim LR 595……………………………………………………………………………………………10
R v Corbett [1996] Crim. L.R. 594 CA………………………………………………………………………………..11
Re A (Conjoined Twins) (2000) 4 All E.R. 961……………………………………………………………………11
R v Cunningham (1957) 2 Q.B 396…………………………………………………………………………………….13
R v Caldwell (1981) 1 All E.R. 96………………………………………………………………………………………13
R v G and R [2003] UKHL 50 (overrulling Caldwell)……………………………………………………………14
Hyam v DPP [1975] A.C. 55……………………………………………………………………………………………..14
R v Moloney [1985] A.C. 905……………………………………………………………………………………………15
R v Hancock & Shankland [1986] A.C. 455…………………………………………………………………………16
R v Nedrick [1986] 3 All E.R 1; [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025…………………………………………………………16
R v Woolin (1998) 4 All E.R. 103………………………………………………………………………………………17
R v Matthews and R v Alleyne (2003) 2 Cr. App. R. 30………………………………………………………..17
R v Vickers is important……………………………………………………………………………………………………17
R vs Rahman…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..18
Worksheet 2 – (Voluntary Manslaughter)……………………………………………………………………………19
R vs Julien (1970) 16 WIR 395………………………………………………………………………………………….19
Julien v R [1970] 16 WIR 395……………………………………………………………………………………………20
Lett v R [1963] 6 WIR 92………………………………………………………………………………………………….21
R v Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932………………………………………………………………………………………….21
R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889……………………………………………………………………………………22
R v Baillie [1995] 2 Cr App R 31……………………………………………………………………………………….22
R v Thornton [1992] 1 All ER 306……………………………………………………………………………………..23
R v Acott [1997] 1 WLR 306…………………………………………………………………………………………….24
1
2
Vasquez v R [1994] 45 WIR 103 Luc………………………………………………………………………………….24
Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1996] 3 WLR 45 AG…………………………………………………………………………24
AG for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 Cr App R 36……………………………………………………………………..25
R v James; R v Karimi [2006] 1 All ER 759………………………………………………………………………..26
R v Serrano [2006] Crim LR 569……………………………………………………………………………………….27
R v Davies [1975] 1 QB 691……………………………………………………………………………………………..27
R v Johnson [1989] 2 ALLER 839 CA………………………………………………………………………………..28
R v Pearson [1992] Crim LR 193 CA………………………………………………………………………………….28
Ramjattan v The State (No 2) [1999] 57 WIR 501………………………………………………………………..28
Bristol v R BB 2002 CA 33……………………………………………………………………………………………….29
R Byrne (1960) 2 QB 396………………………………………………………………………………………………….30
R vs Atkinson (1985)………………………………………………………………………………………………………..30
Walton vs The Queen [ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF BARBADOS]……..31
R v Dietschmann (2003) 1 All ER 897………………………………………………………………………………..31
Worksheet 3 (Involuntary Manslaughter)……………………………………………………………………………31
R v Lamb [1967] 2 All ER 1282…………………………………………………………………………………………31
Dias [2002] 2 Cr App……………………………………………………………………………………………………….31
Kennedy (no.2) [2007] 3 WLR 612…………………………………………………………………………………….32
Arobieke [1988] Crim LR 314……………………………………………………………………………………………33
R v Lowe [1973] QB 702………………………………………………………………………………………………….33
Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576………………………………………………………………………………………….34
DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976] 2 All ER 365…………………………………………………………………..34
AG’s Reference (No.3 of 1994) [1997] 3 All ER 936…………………………………………………………….34
R v Goodfellow [1986] 83 Cr App R23……………………………………………………………………………….35
R v Larkin [1943] 1 All ER 217…………………………………………………………………………………………35
R v Church [1965] 2 All ER 72………………………………………………………………………………………….35
Dawson [1985] 81 Cr App R 150……………………………………………………………………………………….36
R v Ball [1989] Crim LR 730…………………………………………………………………………………………….36
R v Adomako 1994 3 All E.R. 79……………………………………………………………………………………….37
Singh (1999) Crim LR 582 CA…………………………………………………………………………………………..38
Lidar (2000) Archbold News 3 CA……………………………………………………………………………………..38
Worksheet 4 (Non-Fatal Offences Against The Person)………………………………………………………..39
Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commisioner [1969] EW 582……………………………………………………39
Spratt [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1073, EW 627………………………………………………………………………………..39
R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981……………………………………………………………………………………………….40
Byrne [1968] SH 401………………………………………………………………………………………………………..40
R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689…………………………………………………………………………………….40
R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1997] [1997] 3 WLR 534……………………………………………………………..41
R v Constanza [1997] Crim LR 576……………………………………………………………………………………41
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R v Savage [1991] 94 Cr App R 193…………………………………………………………………………………..42
R v Savage, R v Parmenter [1991] 4 All ER 698, (1992) EW 625, SHC 89………………………………42
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374……………………………………………………………………………….43
Wilson v Pringle [1986] 2 All ER 440…………………………………………………………………………………44
R v Miller [1954] 2 QB 282……………………………………………………………………………………………….45
R v Burstow [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 144………………………………………………………………………………..45
Mowatt (1968) 1 QB 421 SH 426……………………………………………………………………………………….46
C (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] 1 QB 331…………………………………………………………………………46
Burrell v Harmer [1965] 3 All ER 684………………………………………………………………………………..47
R v D [1984] 1 AC 778 Missing…………………………………………………………………………………………47
Bolduc and Bird v R (1967) 63 DLR (2d) 82 Missing……………………………………………………………47
R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75…………………………………………………………………………………………..47
R v Wilson [1996] 3 WLR 125…………………………………………………………………………………………..48
R v Richardson [1999] QB 444 CA…………………………………………………………………………………….49
R v Tabassum [2000] Crim LR 686…………………………………………………………………………………….49
R v Dica [2004] Q.B. 1257………………………………………………………………………………………………..50
R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr. App.R. 14…………………………………………………………………………………..51
R v Coney [1882] 8 QBD 534……………………………………………………………………………………………51
R v Bradshaw [1878] 14 Cox 83 Missing…………………………………………………………………………….52
R v Moore [1898] 14 TLR 229 Missing………………………………………………………………………………52
R v Jones [1986] 83 Cr App Rep 375………………………………………………………………………………….52
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Worksheet 1 – Murder
Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority (1991) 1 All E.R. 801, 817 (missing)
R v Poulton (1832) 5 C & P 329
Facts
A mother strangled her newborn baby, and was charged with the murder. Three medical men
testified before a jury that a child can die during the delivery, thus the fact that a child
breathes when it is born before it its whole body is delivered does not mean that it is born
alive:
“It frequently happens that a child is born as far as the head is concerned, and breathes, but
death takes place before the whole delivery is complete. My opinion in this case is, that the
child had breathed; but I cannot take upon myself to say that it was wholly born alive.”
Issue
The issue in question was when a foetus becomes a ‘human being’ for the purposes of murder
and manslaughter.
Held
An unborn child is incapable of being killed. A child is born only when the whole body is
brought into the world, but it is not sufficient that the child breathes in the progress of the
birth, as the child may die before the whole delivery takes place. For a murder or
manslaughter conviction, a child must be killed after it has been fully delivered alive from the
mother’s body. In this case the jury found the child not to be born alive, and therefore the
mother could not be guilty of murder. The case of A-G’s Ref (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR
421 confirmed that an unborn foetus is not capable of being murdered, but a manslaughter
conviction can stand where the foetus was subsequently born alive but dies afterwards from
injuries inflicted whilst in the womb.
R v Brain (1834) 6 C & P 349
(Missing)
R v Reeves (1839) 9 C & P 25
(Missing)
Attorney General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) (1997) 3 All ER 936
The defendant stabbed his pregnant girlfriend in the face, abdomen and back when she was
22-24 weeks pregnant. 17 days after the incident the woman went into premature labour and
gave birth to a live baby. The baby died 121 days later due to the premature birth. The
defendant was charged with wounding and GBH on the mother and convicted for which he
received a sentence of 4 years. On the death of the baby he was also charged with murder and
manslaughter. The trial judge held that he could not be convicted of murder or manslaughter
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since at the time of the attack the foetus was not in law classed as a human being and thus the
mens rea aimed at the mother could not be transferred to the foetus as it would constitute a
different offence. The Attorney General referred the following point of law:
“1.1 Subject to the proof by the prosecution of the requisite intent in either case: whether the
crimes of murder or manslaughter can be committed where unlawful injury is deliberately
inflicted:
(i) to a child in utero
(ii) to a mother carrying a child in utero
where the child is subsequently born alive, enjoys an existence independent of the mother,
thereafter dies and the injuries inflicted while in utero either caused or made a substantial
contribution to the death.
“1.2 Whether the fact that the death of the child is caused solely as a consequence of injury to
the mother rather than as a consequence of direct injury to the foetus can negative any
liability for murder or manslaughter in the circumstances set out in question 1.1.”
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision in relation to murder. The defendant appealed to
the House of Lords
Held:
The appellant’s actions could not amount to murder for the reasons given by the trial judge.
However, his actions could amount to constructive manslaughter. There was no requirement
that the foetus be classed as a human being provided causation was proved. The attack on the
mother was an unlawful act which caused the death of the baby. There is no requirement
under constructive manslaughter that the unlawful act is aimed at the actual victim or that the
unlawful act was directed at a human being.
R v Dyson (1908) 2 K.B. 454
Facts
A child’s certain and imminent death due meningitis was accelerated by the child’s father’s
infliction of serious injuries
Issue
Did the father cause death?
Decision
Yes
Reasoning
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Accelerating death is enough for the law to consider someone as causing death
R v Adams (1957) Crim. L.R. 365
Dr Bodkins Adams had administered a lethal dose of pain killers to a terminally ill patient.
Held:
Dr Bodkins was acquitted of murder.
Devlin J:
“a life shortened by weeks or months is just as much murder as one shortened by years….
However, a doctor is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and
suffering even if such measures may incidentally shorten life.”
R v White (1910) 2 K.B. 124; 22 Cox C.C. 325
Facts
The defendant put poison into the evening drink of the victim, his mother, with the intention
of killing her. The victim drank a few sips of the drink and then fell asleep. She did not wake
up, however the medical evidence was that she had died of a heart attack rather than as a
result of the poison. The defendant also gave evidence that he had not intended to kill her by
a single dose but had planned to deliver multiple doses over a longer period of time. The
defendant was convicted of attempted murder.
Issue
On appeal, the question arose as to whether the defendant could be liable for murder given
that his actions had not factually caused the death. A second issue was whether having
delivered a single dose was a sufficient ‘attempt’ to ground the conviction in light of the
evidence that the defendant had intended the victim to die as a result of later doses which
were never administered.
Held
The court established the ‘but for’ test of causation, according to which the defendant could
not be convicted unless it could be shown that ‘but for’ his actions the victim would not have
died. On the facts of this case the test was not met, therefore the defendant could not be
convicted of murder.
On the issue of attempt, the court held that it was sufficient that the attempted murder had
been begun, notwithstanding that the defendant had not completed his plan. The conviction
for attempted murder was therefore upheld.
R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr.App. Rep. 152
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Facts
Jordan, who worked for the United States Air Force, stabbed a man as the result of a
disturbance. The victim died in hospital eight days later. The post-mortem found that the
victim died of broncho-pneumonia following the abdominal injury sustained. The court in the
first instance found Jordan guilty. The doctor who treated the victim contacted the United
States Air Force authorities as he took a different view as to the cause of death. Leave was
approved for the gathering of further evidence.
Issue
A key issue in this case was whether and under what circumstances could a court listen to
additional evidence. One of the pre-requisites for such an application was that it must be
shown the evidence was not available at the initial trial stage. The appellant had also raised
various defences including provocation, self-defence and the fact that it was an accident.
Held
The court held that the additional evidence was of a nature that would probably have affected
the jury’s verdict. The additional evidence opined that the death was not caused by the wound
at all but that the medical treatment was inappropriate. The victim was intolerant to
terramycin which was noticed and initially stopped before being continued the following day
by another doctor. They had also introduced abnormal quantities of fluid which waterlogged
the victim’s lungs. This evidence was not available at the initial trial and it was believed that
a jury would listen to opinion of two doctors that had the standing the experts did in this case.
On this basis, the conviction was quashed.
R v Smith (1959) 2 Q.B. 35; (1959) 2 All E.R. 193; (1959) 2 W.L.R. 623; 43 Cr. App.Rep.
121
Facts
The defendant was a soldier who stabbed one of his comrades during a fight in an army
barracks. The victim was taken to receive medical attention, but whilst being carried to the
hospital was dropped twice by those carrying him. Once at the hospital, he received negligent
medical treatment; the medics failed to diagnose a puncture to his lung. The victim died of
his injuries, and the defendant was charged with murder and convicted at first instance. The
defendant appealed on the basis that the victim would have survived but for the negligence of
those treating him. He also argued that his confession had been obtained under duress and
was therefore inadmissible.
Issue
The issue was whether the negligence on the part of the doctors was capable of breaking the
chain of causation between the defendant’s action in stabbing the victim, and his ultimate
death.
Held
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The court held that the stab wound was an operating cause of the victim’s death; it did not
matter that it was not the sole cause. In order to break the chain of causation, an event must
be:
“…unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events [and] can be described
as either unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic” (p. 43).
The chain of causation was not broken on the facts of this case.
With respect to the issue of duress, the court held that as the threat was made some time
before the relevant confession and was no longer active at the time of the defendant’s
statement, it did not render the evidence inadmissible. The conviction for murder was
therefore upheld.
R v Blaue (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1411; (1975) 3 All E.R. 446; 61 Cr.App. Rep. 269
Facts
After the victim refused the defendant’s sexual advances the defendant stabbed the victim
four times. Whist the victim was admitted to hospital she required medical treatment which
involved a blood transfusion. The victim was a Jehovah’s Witness whose religious views
precluded accepting a blood transfusion. She was informed that without a blood transfusion
she would die but still refused to countenance treatment as a result of her religious
conviction. The victim subsequently died and the defendant was charged with manslaughter
by way of diminished responsibility. The defendant appealed.
Issue
Did the victim’s refusal to accept medical treatment constitute a novus actus interveniens and
so break the chain of causation between the defendant’s act and her death? Whether the test
laid down in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 was to be applied because of an omission on
behalf of the victim.
Held
The appeal was dismissed. The stab wound and not the girl’s refusal to accept medical
treatment was the operating cause of death. The victim’s rejection of a blood transfusion did
not break the chain of causation. The defendant must take their victim as they find them and
this includes the characteristics and beliefs of the victim and not just their physical condition.
Unlike in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 the victim’s decision was an omission and not
a positive act and so the test was not of whether the omission was reasonably foreseeable. In
the case of omissions by the victim ‘egg-shell skull’ rule was to be applied. Even if R v
Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 is applied the victim’s response was foreseeable taking into
account their particular characteristics.
R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110
Causation and whether consent of victim to injections is relevant; requirements of unlawful
and malicious administration of “noxious thing” under s. 23 of the Offences against the
Person Act 1861
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Facts
Mr Cato and the victim prepared their own syringes and then injected each other with heroin.
The victim died. Mr Cato was convicted of manslaughter and administering a noxious thing
contrary to s. 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He appealed against his
conviction.
Issue
The jury was asked to decide whether the injection caused, contributed to or accelerated the
victim’s death. The judge did not provide the direction that cause or contribution should be
substantial, and advised the jury that the victim’s consent to the heroin injection was
irrelevant to the consideration of whether Mr Cato was reckless or grossly negligent (i.e.
whether he committed manslaughter). Mr Cato argued that the trial judge had thus
misdirected the jury. He also claimed that heroin was not a “noxious” thing and that
“malicious” administration under s. 23 OAPA 1861 had not occurred – i.e. the act of injection
was not unlawful.
Held
The injection of heroin had to be the cause of death in order to find that manslaughter had
taken place. Even though no express directions were given about the necessity of
“substantial” cause of death, it must have been clear to the jury that more than a de minimis
contribution was required. Secondly, the victim’s consent might be relevant to the finding of
recklessness or gross negligence but consent in itself is not a defence to manslaughter. The
jury was thus not misdirected. Thirdly, as Mr Cato had unlawfully taken heroin into his
possession in order to inject the victim with it, the act of injection was itself unlawful in
relation to the charge of manslaughter. Finally, heroin is a potentially harmful substance and
thus a “noxious” thing for the purposes of s. 23 OAPA 1861; since the act of administration
was deliberate and direct, there is no need to find “maliciousness”.
R v Cheshire (1991) 3 All E.R. 670
Facts
Cheshire shot a man during the course of an argument. The victim was taken to hospital to
have surgery and shortly after developed respiratory issues. The doctors inserted a
tracheotomy tube, which remained in place for four weeks and initially improved the victim’s
condition. Several days later the victim complained of respiratory issues, his condition soon
worsened and he died shortly afterwards. The post-mortem found that the victim’s windpipe
had narrowed near the location where the tracheotomy pipe had been inserted. Cheshire was
subsequently charged with murder and convicted. The decision was appealed.
Issue
A key issue in this case was whether the accused’s acts of shooting the victim had caused the
death or whether the chain of causation was broken by the negligent medical treatment that
the victim had received following being injured by the shooting. The judge in this case
directed the jury to decide whether Cheshire’s acts could have made a ‘significant
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contribution’ to the victim’s death. Importantly, the judge directed the jury that the acts need
not be the sole or even main cause of death.
Held
Appeal dismissed. The jury was not required to evaluate the competing causes of death and
therefore the judge was right to direct them as he did in the first instance. It was clear that the
negligent medical treatment in this case was the immediate cause of the victim’s death but
that did not absolve the accused unless the treatment was so independent the accused’s act to
regard the contribution as insignificant.
R v Williams (1992) 2 All E.R. 183 C.A.
The victim was a hitchhiker picked up by Mr Williams; Mr Davis and Mr Bobat were
passengers in the car. After a few miles, the victim jumped out of the moving car and
suffered fatal injuries. Mr Williams and Mr Davis were convicted of manslaughter and
robbery after the jury accepted that they robbed the victim (as pre-planned) and threatened
him with physical violence as a result of which he jumped out of the car; Mr Bobat was
acquitted. Mr Williams and Davis appealed.
Issue
The judge directed the jury that statements to the police could only be used against the maker
of the statement, but Mr Williams argued that the evidence was too tenuous to go before the
jury, and that his conviction was inconsistent with Mr Bobat’s acquittal. Mr Davis claimed
that the judge should have accepted a submission of no case to answer; that his conviction
was based on Mr Bobat’s statement to the police and that evidence of the mere presence of a
knife and stick in the car should not have been admitted.
Held
Firstly, the evidence shown in order to prove the presence of a joint enterprise to rob the
victim applied equally against all defendants and thus the conviction of Messrs Williams and
Davis was indeed inconsistent with Mr Bobat’s acquittal. It follows that that the jury must
have used the defendants’ statements to the police against other defendants, despite the
judge’s direction to the contrary. Further, the jury should have been directed that the victim’s
actions must be proportional to the gravity of the threat. Based on these failures, joint
enterprise could not be proven and, consequently, the case for robbery failed. In the absence
of an unlawful act, the elements of manslaughter were also not present.
R v Dear [1996] Crim LR 595
The defendant’s daughter accused a man of sexually abusing her. The defendant went after
man and repeatedly slashed him with a Stanley knife. The victim received medical treatment
but later re-opened his wounds in what was thought to be a suicide and died two days after
the initial attack. The defendant argued the man’s actions in opening the wounds amounted to
a novus actus intervenes.
Held

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